The US Capitol Police opened 14,938 threat assessment cases in 2025, up from 9,474 in 2024, a rise of almost 58% in a single year. Then on November 3, Americans voted in the midterm elections, and the day passed with a handful of bomb threats, some fake text messages and no major violence.

Both things are true, and the gap between them is the useful part. Political violence in the US has not been concentrated on election days. It has arrived at homes, on campuses, at fairs and on short walks from a hotel. Here is what the data shows, what happened around the vote, and what it means for anyone responsible for protecting a public figure or an executive.

How big is the threat?

Four official sources point the same way.

Executives are inside the same trend. In a 2025 survey by the security company Allied Universal, 46% of US corporate security chiefs said the threat of violence to their executives had risen over two years. Boards have responded with money. 37.8% of S&P 500 companies disclosed security spending for executives in 2025, up from 23.6% in 2021.

At a glance: the threat data

Source

Figure

Period

US Capitol Police

14,938 threat cases

2025

Secret Service

~10,000 threats investigated

2026, to July

US Marshals

562 threats, 395 judges

Fiscal 2025

Local officials (Princeton)

54% faced hostility

Q1 2026

S&P 500 companies

37.8% pay for executive security

2025

Bar chart on light paper: US Capitol Police threat assessment cases per year, 8,613 in 2020 rising to 14,938 in 2025

The attacks that changed the planning

The list of serious attacks and plots since mid-2024 is long. Read together, these are the ones that matter most for protective planning:

Three patterns run through that list. The targets included executives as well as politicians. The places were often homes and routine moments rather than big set-piece events. And where a protective detail was close and a plan existed, the outcome was better.

Newsprint collage of a suburban house with a security camera, a map with a red location pin and a figure walking up the driveway, crossed by red barrier tape
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Political violence in the US has not been concentrated on election days. It has arrived at homes, on campuses, at fairs and on short walks from a hotel.

What happened around the vote

The run-up was tense. The FBI issued a public warning on threats to election workers in mid-October. Election offices in at least 13 states received letters containing white powder, and on November 3 the Justice Department charged an Oklahoma man in connection with hundreds of letters, which turned out to contain a harmless powder.

Election Day itself was quiet. The national election security center reported a bomb threat at a polling site in Toledo, threats to several schools, and fake "polling place moved" texts in Fulton County. A threat in Gibraltar, Michigan, moved voting into a high school parking lot for part of the day. As of November 4, no major candidate was disputing the results.

Voters line up outside a brick school polling place on an autumn morning while a police officer talks with an election worker

Analysts warned against reading too much into a calm day. Pam Smith of Verified Voting called it "a pause, not a resolution." The data backs her caution in one specific way. A September review by the Center for Strategic and International Studies counted 11 election-related terrorism incidents between 2015 and mid-2026, and only one was planned for Election Day itself. The risk tends to sit in the weeks around a vote and in the people it elevates, more than in the polling place.

Dates to watch next:

  • November 9. A court hearing in the Kirk case.

  • December 18. Federal sentencing in the Thompson case.

  • January 3, 2027. The new Congress is sworn in, along with a wave of new governors in January.

Five lessons for protection teams

The incident record and the research behind it point to five practical changes.

  1. Treat the home as a primary site. Several of the most serious attacks of the last two years happened at residences. In the 2022 attack on Paul Pelosi, Capitol Police cameras recorded the break-in with no one watching. A camera only helps if someone is monitoring it and knows what to do next.

  2. Shrink the home address footprint. The Minnesota attacker carried a list of 11 people-search websites. In a Consumer Reports test, doing the removals by hand cleared 70% of listings within a week, faster than the paid services it tested.

  3. Watch for leakage as well as threats. The FBI's guide on targeted violence says most attackers do not threaten their targets directly. They tell someone else. Monitoring that only looks for direct threats will miss the warning.

  4. Assess every venue, including friendly ones. The Kirk review found no formal assessment of an event attended by about 3,000 people. Campus talks, town halls and fairs need the same advance as a conference keynote.

  5. Close the short walks. The Thompson attack happened on a routine walk between a hotel and an event. Those few unprotected minutes are where planning tends to be thinnest.

A protective detail in dark suits walks a man across a sunny campus plaza past crowds of students holding up phones

At a glance: five lessons

Lesson

Practical step

The home is a primary site

Monitored cameras, a written response plan

Addresses are public

Quarterly removal sweep, done by hand

Attackers leak

Monitor for talk about venues and events

Friendly venues get hit

Formal assessment for every appearance

Short walks are exposed

Plan the hotel-to-venue minutes

The UK is seeing the same pattern

UK readers will recognize all of this. The former minister Ann Widdecombe was killed at her Devon home in July, and the Home Secretary has ordered a review of protective security for royals, ministers, MPs and local representatives. The Electoral Commission found that 55% of candidates in the May 2026 local elections were harassed or intimidated. In a 2025 survey of 224 MPs, 27% had received death threats.

What comes next

The midterms are over, but the numbers behind them are not going down. For protection teams, the next step is to stop planning around the last election and start planning around the next year.

We have done that work in this week's premium briefing, The 2027 Threat Outlook: Seven Shifts Protection Teams Should Plan For Now. It covers political violence alongside state-directed plots on US and UK soil, drones that private teams cannot legally stop, AI-cloned voices, Martyn's Law and the repriced travel map. It includes a first-quarter plan and a downloadable 2027 Threat Planning Worksheet that scores each shift against your own principal.

The 2027 Threat Outlook

Seven shifts protection teams should plan for next year, a first-quarter plan, and the 2027 Threat Planning Worksheet that scores each shift against your own principal.

If you are not yet a subscriber, On The Circuit, our free weekly intelligence briefing, is read by more than 12,000 protection professionals.

Data and court records were checked on November 5, 2026. Vendor survey figures are flagged where used.