The Circuit Magazine Counter-Surveillance

Programme Self-Assessment

Run this against your current executive protection programme. The failures below tend to cluster — a programme weak in one area is usually weak in the adjacent one.

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Threat Assessment 3 items

Does each principal have an individual threat assessment, not a generic one?

Is the assessment reviewed and updated when the principal's exposure changes?

Does it incorporate open-source monitoring, legal/HR intelligence, and localized crime data?

Intelligence Layer 3 items

Is there a designated function responsible for pre-movement intelligence gathering?

Is advance work structured to go beyond logistics into environmental threat assessment?

Is threat intelligence integrated into protection planning, not just noted separately?

Routine & Predictability 3 items

Are departure times, routes, and vehicle combinations varied on a regular schedule?

Are surveillance detection routes run as standard practice, not only on elevated threat days?

Have alternate entrances and exits been identified and used for all regular locations?

Counter-Surveillance Posture 3 items

Is there a low-profile surveillance detection capability separate from the close protection team?

Is there a standardized process for documenting suspected surveillance observations?

Is the default posture observation and documentation rather than confrontation?

Digital Integration 3 items

Is there active monitoring of the principal's digital footprint for exposure and doxxing attempts?

Have family members and household staff been briefed on information security?

Is there a defined protocol for escalating physical security posture when a digital threat is identified?

Peripheral Security 3 items

Have residential routes and patterns for family members been assessed?

Do household staff and regular family members have a direct reporting channel to the protection intelligence function?

Has the residence been assessed for patterns of observation at regular intervals?

Reporting & Documentation 3 items

Is there a centralized system for logging suspicious activity observations?

Are reports reviewed and cross-referenced on a regular cycle?

Is field observation integrated with current threat intelligence in the review process?

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